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Abstract 
This study examined the relation between Attributional Complexity and 
how perceivers' organise and retrieve personality impressions from 
memory. One hundred and two subjects were asked to either: (a) form an 
impression of a target person described by twenty behaviourial sentences; (b) 
form an impression, and subsequently write a personality description of the 
target, and justify it with another subject, or (c) simply memorise as many 
sentences as they could. As predicted, subjects given impression formation 
instructions recalled significantly more behaviours than did subjects in the 
memory condition. In addition, attributionally complex subjects recalled 
significantly more items than attributionally simple subjects, but only in the 
two impression formation conditions when in-depth processing was 
encouraged; when in-depth processing was restricted in the memory 
condition there was no difference in recall between the attributionally 
complex and simple subjects. Also as expected, the attributionally complex 
subjects tended to write more complex personality descriptions of the target 
person. These results were discussed in relation to various accounts of 
person memory and it was concluded that individuals' who operate with 
more complex cognitive schemata have more ability than individuals' with 
simple schemata to understand, encode and subsequently recall a welter of 
trait related person information. However, this ability tends to be 
emphasised when there is sufficient motivation and challenge to do so. 
General implications are drawn for the relation between attributional 




A vital part of the process of knowing an individual is the impression one 
develops and maintains of that person. Impressions are formed fairly 
quickly on the basis of evidence of what that individual is like including 
direct observation of behaviour, physical appearance, heresay, one's 
evaluative reactions together with continued inferences made about that 
person. This impression then serves to guide our interpretation of further 
information. However, what is an impression? How is it structured and 
stored? And how is it maintained and amended? These questions have 
bemused social psychologists for over 40 years. 
The_ study of impression formation has been a fertile and dynamic area of 
research. From a historical perspective there have been three overlapping 
eras in the study of impression formation research including Asch's (1946) 
seminal qualitative approach, Anderson's (1974) algebraic models of 
information integration, and most recently the information-processing 
paradigm developed by Hamilton and others (Hamilton, 1981; Srull, 1981). 
From his classic early work on the processes of impression formation, Asch 
(1946, 1952) is generally considered the pioneer of research in this field. 
Asch was the first to propose that forming an impression is an active on-
going process which begins immediately on encountering information 
about a person. According to Asch, a dynamic interaction between new and 
current information is the process by which the perceiver systematically 
organises the person's personality into a unified coherent gestalt. 
Towards the end of the 1950s, Asch's research orientation was criticised as 
being too subjective and imprecise (see Devine & Ostrom, 1989). In order to 
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find a more quantifiable and precise way to study impressions, researchers 
revolutionised the empirical paradigm. The definition of impression 
formation was changed to a rating of one's liking for the stimulus person. 
This second period of study into the impression formation process was 
characterised by Anderson's (1962, 1968, 1972, 1974, 1981) research on 
algebraic models of information integration. This research focused on 
investigating how perceivers' integrate incoming stimulus information 
about target persons to arrive at single judgements. 
However, since the early 1980s, researchers have approached the study of 
impression formation from an information-processing perspective in an 
attempt to understand how information about a person is encoded, 
organised, and recalled from memory. An integral part of this approach has 
been the study of inference processes in which the perceiver uses an existing 
im~ession as a basis for elaborative processing. 
This interest in inference processes has lead to to a revolutionary conceptual 
approach which interprets attribution theory in an information processing 
frameworki "An attribution is an inference - specifically an inference about 
the cause for a particular behaviour" (Hamilton et al. 1990, p. 891). In sum, 
this new orientation considers the attribution process as a type of inference 
that might occur in the impression formation sequence. Acknowledging 
that the attribution process has an important role to play in forming an 
impression from an information-processing perspective, it was my general 
aim in this research to investigate individual differences in peoples' ability 
to engage in this attributional inference process. Specifically, it was the goal 
of this thesis to assess how differences in attributional complexity effect how 
person impressions are organised and retrieved from memory. 
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The following introduction will consist of eight main sections. First, I will 
discuss the recently adopted information-processing orientation. Second, I 
will discuss a series of studies by Hamilton and his colleagues which will 
characterise the experimental paradigm of my study. In the third and fourth 
sections I will discuss two research issues that have come out of Hamilton et 
al 's findings, and propose some hypotheses derived from a model 
concerning how various encoding instructions affect the retrieval of 
information from memory. In the fifth section I discuss the integration of 
attribution theory with an information processing approach to impression 
formation. Sixth, I introduce the issue of individual differences in 
perceivers' abilities to engage in the impression formation process and 
discuss the scant research in this area. In the seventh section I further 
discuss the role of the attributional inference process in relation to 
impression formation, but from an individual differences perspective. 
More specifically I derive several predictions from the hypothesis 
concerning how individuals differ in the complexity of the attributional 
schemata they use in explaining human behaviour. Finally, I will briefly 
review the basic aims and hypotheses of this study. 
An Information-Processing Approach to Impression Formation 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the focus of research on impression formation 
processes was on how a perceiver integrates and combines pieces of 
information about a target person into a single judgement of that person. 
Despite the impressive levels of precision achieved by these integration 
models, it was apparent towards the end of the 1970s that this approach to 
the study of impression formation was severely limited. Hamilton, Katz 
and Leirer (1980a, 1980b) were some of the first researchers to question the 
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adequacy of information integration models to capture the entire 
impression formation process. 
The first reason suggested for the incompleteness of this approach was that 
although these models provided a good description of the relationship 
between target stimuli and subjects' judgements, they provided minimal 
insight into the processes underlying these judgements. 
A second reason given for the incompleteness of the information 
integration approach concerned the exclusive focus on a single dependent 
variable, usually a judgement of one's liking for the stimulus target person. 
This single response measure was then used to evaluate the utility of the 
algebraic model being tested, and as such, capture one's impression of the 
stimulus person. Hamilton et al. argued that although one's liking of a 
person is an important part of the formative process (Zajonc, 1980), there is 
more to an impression than a single evaluative judgement. 
From these criticisms and subsequent dissatisfaction with the information 
integration models evolved a social cognitive perspective in the form of an 
information-processing framework. Rather than a single evaluative 
judgement of one's "liking" for the stimulus person, researchers became 
interested in examining the encoding, organisation, and retrieval activities 
involved in the process of forming an impression. 
Redefining the term "Impression" 
Hamilton and his colleagues (Hamilton et al., 1980a; 1980b; Hamilton, 1981) 
were the pioneers of this perspective, re-defining the term impression as 
"the perceiver's organised cognitive representation of another person" 
(Hamilton et al., 1980b, p. 123). These researchers hypothesised a number of 
processes and structures that contribute to the formation of the perceiver's 
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cognitive representation, including attentional and encoding processes, 
organisation of information by employing one's implicit personality theory1 
(cf. Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972; Schneider, 1973), and the elaborative processes 
of inference and evaluation. 
The formation and maintenance of the perceiver's cognitive representation 
is an ongoing process. Incoming bits of information are continually 
integrated into the dynamic impression. The result of this process is a 
network of associations between the items of information, termed a 
propositional network. A propositional network consists of a set of nodes 
and links, where each node is an item (for example, a trait or behaviour), 
and each link is a relation between items. According to Fiske and Taylor 
(1984), these networks are: (a) associative in which nodes are linked 
together; (b) directional, where it might be easier to remember the facts by 
working from the top down, and (c) strengthened each time they are 
activated. 
According to the third criterion, the strengthening of the network of 
interitem associations through repeated activation is hypothesised to 
facilitate subsequent recall of information acquired about the stimulus 
person. This idea was the central premise of a series of studies by Hamilton 
and his colleagues examining how perceivers organise incoming items of 
information in their cognitive representations. Because Hamilton's 
1There is a large body of research which has demonstrated that perceivers have cognitive 
structures or set patterns for storing and processing trait related information. This 
structure is widely assumed to be a two dimensional representation with a positive and 
negative end to separate social and intellectual meta-structures. The perceiver's 
implicit personality theory, underlined by these basic dimensions then serves as a set 
of cognitive strategies that the perceiver uses in selecting and encoding information 
about a target person. Thus, the perceiver's structure then influences what information 
about the target is processed (see Schneider, Hastorf and Ellsworth, 1979, for a 
discussion of this literature). 
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experimental paradigm was used in the current study, I will describe this 
research in some detail. 
The Hamilton Studies on Impression Formation 
As discussed above, Hamilton et al's (Hamilton & Lim, 1979; Hamilton et 
al., 1980a, 1980b) experiments are based on several assumptions: 
" .... that impressions tend to be highly organised, that. achieving this 
organisation the perceiver develops a network of associations among items of 
information about the person, and that this characteristic of the resulting 
cognitive representation would facilitate recall of the descriptive information" 
(Hamilton et al., 1980b, p. 141). 
Hamilton and his colleagues constructed an empirical paradigm to test these 
assumptions. Assuming that a perceiver's organisational network of 
interitem associations (cognitive representation) facilitates recall, they 
predicted that subjects instructed to form an impression of a target person 
described by 16 behaviour predicates would organise the information in 
memory according to the personality categories conveyed by the 
descriptions, and that this organisational process would facilitate superior 
recall of the behaviours as compared to memory task subjects. 
Results from numerous experiments provided strong support for Hamilton 
et al's hypotheses. First, their results showed over seven different 
experiments that subjects given impression formation instructions 
remembered significantly more behaviours than subjects in the memory 
condition (Hamilton, 1981, p.142). A second finding concerned the 
organisation of the participants' recall protocols in terms of the four 
personality themes. Specifically, impression formation subjects organised 
the stimulus items in terms of the personality categories to a greater extent 
than memory task subjects. Taken together, these findings are consistent 
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with the prediction that forming an impression requires the perceiver to 
organise information into a coherent structure and that this organisation 
facilitates subsequent recall of particular information. These findings have 
subsequently been replicated on numerous occasions by other researchers 
(Srull, 1981, 1983; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 1985; Wyer, Bodenhausen 
and Srull, 1984; Wyer & Gordon, 1982). 
These findings and the accompanying experimental paradigm have been the 
catalyst for numerous researchers seeking to understand how information 
available about a person is acquired, organised, and retrieved in developing 
an impression about that individual. Although there have been a variety of 
topics investigated, the two foci of this research has been on: (a) the 
differential processing, organisation, and retrieval of behaviours that are 
either consistent or inconsistent with an initial trait impression of a 
stimulus character, and (b) the effects of various processing contexts and 
their influence on the way the information is encoded, organised, and 
retrieved from memory. 
Representation and Retrieval of Information Consistent and Inconsistent 
with an Impression 
In the studies reported by Hamilton and his colleagues, the stimulus 
materials described only socially desirable behaviours. Yet throughout the 
process of knowing someone, we usually encounter behaviours that are 
inconsistent with our existing impression of the person. The study of how 
the perceiver recalls and organises this inconsistent information has been 
the focus of a great deal of investigation from researchers adopting an 
information-processing orientation. 
In a landmark article, Hastie and Kumar (1979) found that behaviours 
inconsistent with an initial trait based impression were more likely to be 
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recalled than congruent behaviours. This has proved to be a remarkably 
robust finding and has been replicated in many subsequent studies (for 
reviews see Hamilton, Grubb, Acorn, Trolier & Carpenter, 1990; Bargh & 
Thein, 1984). 
Th~se results have generally been interpreted in terms of network models 
which posit that inconsistent behaviours are more likely to be recalled 
because perceivers create a greater number of associative linkages in 
memory as the behaviours are reconciled with consistent information and 
integrated into a unitary impression. Numerous network models have 
been developed by researchers to explain this finding. These include the 
associative network model (Hastie, 1980; Srull, 1981), the complete 
association model (Hamilton et al., 1980a; Srull; 1983), and the dual coding 
model (Wyer & Go~don, 1982, 1984; Srull & Wyer, 1989). 
The Influence of Various Encoding Tasks on the Organisation of 
Impressions in Memory 
There are a number of studies in which the processing context is varied by 
manipulating the instructions given to the participants. Fiske and Taylor 
(1984) sort to integrate a typology of encoding tasks and provide an 
explanation for variations in person memory as a function of task 
instruction by developing the Depth of Processing Model. 
A Depth of Processing Model. 
Based on Craik and Lockhart's (1972) depth of processing theory, Fiske and 
Taylor (1984) argued that deeper more elaborate processing improves 
memory organisation and hence enhances recall: 
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"One's memory for information about other people appears to improve the more 
psychologically engaging and less superficial the purpose which one approaches 
learning about them ..... " (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p.225). 
From their review of person memory research they classified five levels of 
processing that depend on the perceiver's degree of psychological 
engagement (see Table 1). 
Table 1 
Effects of Various Task Purposes on Person Memory 
Task 
1. Memorising 
2. Forming Impressions 
3. Empathising 
4. Self Reference 
5. Future Interaction 
Effect 
Variable memory, organised by whatever 
is available including psychologically 
irrelevant categories 
Good memory, organised by traits 
Excellent memory, organised by goals 
Excellent memory, organised by 
psychological categories (traits or goals) 
Better memory than memorising, effect on 
organisation not yet clear 
Source: Fiske and Taylor (1984, p.229). 
In moving down the continuum from memorising to future interaction, 
the level of processing determines the effectiveness of the organisational 
memory strategy which in turn determines greater recall of information. 
The foregoing set of studies by Hamilton et al. (1980a, 1980b) indicated that 
forming impressions of a target requires more elaborative processing than 
does simply memorising specific behaviours; consequently impression-task 
subjects have superior recall. Empathising, by focussing on the target 
person's goals, requires an even deeper level of processing because the 
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person's imagined goals provide easily retrievable links among items in 
memory (Bower, Gilligan & Monteiro, 1974). Self-referent encoding, where 
interpersonal information is processed in terms of the person's cognitive 
schema, has sometimes produced superior memory to other-referent 
encoding (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977). Future Interaction may be the 
most psychologically engaging of all task purposes. Srull and Brand (1983) 
found that compared to standard memory instructions, subjects who 
expected to interact with the target person in the future were more likely to 
organise the information around the individual in memory and this 
processing facilitated retrieval. 
In the present study I aimed to assess the validity of the depth of processing 
approach by utilising an information processing paradigm similar to that 
used by Hamilton et al. Based on the premise that deeper more elaborate 
psychological processing facilitates recall from memory, I hypothesised that 
one's memory of a target person, described by 20 conflicting behaviourial 
predicates would significantly improve across three processing tasks: (a) 
subjects attempting to remember as many of the behaviours as possible; (b) 
subjects instructed to form an impression of the target, and (c) subjects 
instructed to form an impression of the target and describe their account 
with another. 
The Attribution Process and Impression Formation 
In an attempt to extend our understanding of the impression formation 
process, it appears that research into person memory has entered a fourth 
era. Specifically, a conceptual framework which views attribution theory in 
the context of an information-processing system is proving a fruitful 
avenue for impression formation research in the 1990s. 
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Attribution refers to the linking of an event to its causes (Ross & Fletcher, 
1985). When developing an impression, liberal use of attributions perhaps 
implies a relatively in-depth level of information processing. Moreover, 
attributions may influence how the information is represented in memory, 
and consequently effect the extent to which attribution-relevant 
information is recalled. 
Hamilton and his colleagues (Hamilton, 1988; Hamilton, Drisoll & Worth, 
1989; Hamilton, Grubb, Acorn, Trolier & Carpenter, 1990; Hamilton, Grubb, 
Trolier & Carpenter, 1987) have applied attribution theory to the impression 
formation process. When confronted with person information, the 
processing circumstances will partly determine the degree of difficulty in 
arriving at an attributional inference. For example, suppose you learned 
that a waitress named Sarah had complained that the restaurant manager 
had unfairly dismissed her. As a perceiver, your task is to decide whether 
Sarah's dismissal is of her own making - a person attribution - or was due to 
something about the manager or restaurant - a situation attribution. You 
learn that Sarah has been dismissed from three previous waitressing jobs, 
was late on occasions for work, and that other staff consider the manager to 
be reasonably fair. This information would most likely lead you to think 
that Sarah's complaints are unjustified and thus lead to a person 
attribution. However, you may also learn that the manager sets unusually 
high standards, dismissed Sarah without legal warning, and had been 
looking to lay off staff because of poor business. This additional context 
information makes attributional analysis more difficult and thus you would 
face greater difficulty attributing causality to either the person or the 
situation. 
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This example illustrates that when context information consistently implies 
a particular cause, making an attribution may be relatively simple and 
require minimal cognitive processing. On the other hand, when context 
information is ambiguous, more consideration of the information and its 
implications is required. Difficult attribution tasks require the perceiver to 
engage in extended processing which in turn appears to generate a more 
elaborate pattern of interitem associations among the items as they are 
represented in memory (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). In this case behaviourial 
information associated with more difficult attribution tasks should be better 
organised, develop more associative connections with other items, and 
hence be more easily recalled at a later date from memory (Hamilton et al.1 
1990). This analysis lead Hamilton and his colleagues to predict and confirm 
that difficult attribution tasks result in higher recall of attribution-relevant 
information than easier attribution tasks (Hamilton et al.1 1987, 1990). 
These researchers also extended the attribution paradigm to investigate the 
robust finding by Hastie and others (Srull, 1981; Srull et al.1 1985) where 
behaviours inconsistent with an initial impression were recalled with 
higher probability than impression-congruent behaviours. They found that 
a behaviour was more likely to be recalled if its attributional implications 
were incongruent with the causal implications of the other pehaviours. The 
contradictory items were presumably more difficult to integrate into the 
evolving impression, spent more time in working memory, and hence 
developed stronger links with other items. These associative linkages 
provided more retrieval routes for recall of inconsistent items at a later 
time. 
In addition, past research supports the contention that expectancy 
incongruent person information triggers attributional analysis (Asch & 
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Zukier, 1986; Clary & Tesser, 1983; Crocker, Hannah & Weber, 1983; Hastie, 
1984; Weiner, 1985). For example, Clary and Tesser provided subjects with 
information about a target person that established a particular impression 
(for example, selfishness), and followed it with behaviourial sentences that 
were either congruent or incongruent with the existing impression. When 
they were instructed to retell their information, subjects were more likely to 
use explanatory accounts (engage in attributional analysis) when the 
behaviour description was incongruent with the existing impression than 
when it was congruent. Moreover, Crocker et al. (1983) found that the type 
of attribution elicited by behaviours incongruent with an existing 
impression has a critical impact on the extent to which that information is 
processed and retained in memory. Incongruent information was only 
more likely to be recalled than congruent information if it was attributed to 
dispositional causes rather than situation causes. 
Asch and Zukier (1984) identified and described several ways individuals 
engage in causal reasoning to resolve inconsistent information to form a 
unified impression of a target person. They identified seven modes of 
resolution in which perceivers explained how two seemingly inconsistent 
attributes could be descriptive of the same individual. For example, 
perceivers resolved the dispositions by segregating each attribute to a 
different domain of the individual. An excellent illustration of this mode 
of attributional analysis is the way a seemingly discordant pair brilliant-
foolish was resolved: "A person may be brilliant intellectually but foolish in 
practical, common-sense matters; probably very bright about abstract 
matters, but silly about day-to-day practical tasks" (p. 1233). This exemplifies 
how we as naive perceivers engage in causal analysis to resolve conflicting 
person information. 
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Taken together, these findings critically suggest that attributional processing 
contributes both to the extent to which person information is encoded and 
subsequently to the way it is represented and retrieved from memory. 
Moreover, this research supports the idea that attributional processes are 
intimately involved with the process of developing impressions. 
Specifically, it follows that when the impression formation task is complex 
and the perceiver is faced with discordant behaviours, he or she should be 
likely to invoke attributional processes as an aid to understanding person 
information. However, the critical question addressed in this study 
concerns the issue of whether some perceivers' with more well developed 
attributional schemata are more skilled at engaging in this inference process 
than others when developing impressions. 
Individual Differences in Impression Formation 
One type of analysis that has rarely been considered in impression 
formation research is the study of individual differences in the ability of 
naive perceivers to encode, organise, and retrieve information from their 
person memory. In one of the few studies, Srull, Lichtenstein and Rothbart 
(1985) investigated the effects on person memory of individual differences 
in perceivers' need for cognition. 
Need for cognition generally refers to the tendency to engage in and enjoy 
thinking (Cohen, Scotland & Wolfe, 1955). Using an empirically based scale 
developed to measure an individual's need for cognition (Caccioppo & 
Petty, 1982), Srull and his colleagues found that following an impression 
formation task, high need for cognition subjects recalled more behaviours 
descriptive of a stimulus person than low need for cognition subjects. This 
result was explained by arguing that high need for cognition subjects 
compared to low need for cognition subjects, were more likely to think 
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about the items in relationship to one another and presumably developed 
more associative links. Consequently, this more elaborate associative 
activity by high need for cognition subjects facilitated subsequent retrieval of 
the behaviours. 
In the present research I further investigated the role of individual 
differences in the ability to utilise causal attribution processes in developing 
person impressions. 
In a study of peoples' causal structures (or schemas) for inferring causes for 
behaviours, Wimer and Kelly (1982) noted the presence of individual 
differences in attributional complexity; certain individuals tended to make 
simple attributions involving only one cause, while other individuals 
tended to make complex attributions involving several causes. The 
presence of differences in individuals' attributional schema complexity has 
also been supported by subsequent research (Fiske, Kinder & Larter, 1983; 
Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson & Reeder, 1986). 
There were two related reasons why I believed measuring individual 
differences in attributional complexity would expand our understanding of 
the impression formation process. First, previous research has shown that 
some people do indeed possess more complex attributional schemata than 
others. Second, as previously argued, recent research has confirmed that 
causal attribution processes are integrally involved in the way person 
information is encoded and represented in memory. (Hamilton et al., 1990). 
Individual Differences in Attributional Complexity 
Within an impression formation context, I intended to measure the 
complexity of attributional schemata using a recently developed scale, 
termed the Attributional Complexity Scale developed by Fletcher, 
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Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson arid Reeder (1986) The underlying premise 
of this scale is that some people possess more complex attributional 
schemata for explaining peoples behaviour than others. Specifically, the 
Attributional Complexity Scale is a 28 item questionnaire that has seven 
attributional sub-constructs which vary along a simple-complex cognitive 
dimension. They include: (a) level of interest or motivation in processing 
information; (b) preference for complex rather than simple attributions; (c) 
presence of meta-cognitions concerning explanations; (d) awareness of the 
extent to which peoples' behaviour is a function of interaction with others; 
(e) tendency to infer abstract or causally complex internal attributions; (f) 
tendency to infer abstract, contemporary, external causal attributions, and (g) 
the tendency to infer causes operating from the past. 
Recent work with this scale has provided support for its reliability and 
validity (Brookings & Brown, 1988; Marsh & Weary, 1989; Fletcher, Grigg & 
Bull, 1988; Flett, Pliner & Blankstein, 1989). It has been found that the scale 
possesses good internal reliability, with all seven dimensions contributing 
to the single underlying construct of attributional complexity. Moreover, 
psychometric evidence has been garnered for the scale's convergent and 
discriminant validity, concurrent validity and predictive validity. 
The Attributional Complexity Scale has been applied to several research 
settings where it has been useful to identify individuals with complex and 
abstract causal schemata. For example, consider the moderating effect of 
attributional complexity on the fundamental attribution error: the tendency 
to prefer dispositional explanations for others' behaviour and be relatively 
insensitive to situational constraints (Ross, 1977). Several researchers have 
found that attributionally complex subjects produce more accurate trait and 
attitude judgements than do those with simple schemata, but only under 
conditions that encourage in-depth processing of person information. 
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(Devine, 1989; Fletcher, Reeder & Bull, 1990; Fletcher, Rhodes, Rosanowski 
& Lange, 1990). In a study assessing reaction time, Fletcher, Rhodes, 
Rosanowski and Lange (1990) found that attributionally complex subjects 
tended to control the amount of processing time according to the difficulty 
levels of causal problems, whereas attributionally simple folk did not 
control their processing according to the difficulty level of the problems. 
Further, Fletcher et al. (1988) reported that attributionally complex persons 
produced more accurate personality impressions than did attributionally 
simple subjects, on the basis of a fifteen minute interaction with a stranger. 
However, this difference was present only in the condition where subjects 
were motivated to develop a personality appraisal of their partner as 
opposed to the simple aim of having a conversation. 
This research investigating individual differences in causal attributions has 
important implications for how we form person impressions. It appears 
that the causal inferences generated when we process person information 
are all important to how effectively we organise and represent our 
impressions in person memory. Assuming this theorising is correct, then 
persons with more complex attributional schemata should be capable of 
organising and retrieving personality impressions more efficiently than 
persons with simple schemata; but also if prior findings are correct, this 
difference will be more likely to occur under conditions that provide 
sufficient motivation for in-depth processing. 
Attributional Complexity and Impression Formation 
A common tenet of the previous research exploring individual differences 
in attributional schemata was that differences between low and high 
complexity persons were only evident when people had the motivation and 
time to engage in attributional processing. Not all situations are endowed 
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with the inherent motivation to produce spontaneous attributional 
processing: 
"The critical theoretical point here is that attributionally complex people are 
capable of using either complex or simple schemata in generating causal 
attributions; conversely attributionally simple folk are permanently restricted to 
the more primitive forms of causal schemata" (Fletcher et al., 1986, p. 883). 
Thus, in a processing situation where a person with complex attributional 
schemata is not particularly interested in finding complex causes for 
behaviour, he or she may be just as likely to use a quick or automatic 
heuristic (Anderson, 1985) just as a simple person would. There are 
however several processing conditions that are likely to encourage persons 
to use their complex strategies. 
Bassili and Smith (1986) identified five situations which should trigger 
spontaneous attributional processing: (a) the presence of questions inquiring 
about the causes of behaviour; (b) the occurrence of unexpected events; (c) 
the participant's dependence on the target for desired outcomes; (d) the 
participant's failure at a task, and (e) perceived loss of control. 
Several of these conditions are present in the typical impression formation 
experimental paradigm. For example, in the process of forming an 
impression the perceiver will tend to consider why the target behaved in 
various ways. The perceiver may also be called upon to incorporate 
surprising behaviourial occurrences into the emerging impression. Further, 
previous research has suggested that information that is incongruent or 
inconsistent with the evolving impression triggers or activates the 
attribution process (Hamilton, 1988, p. 373). 
Thus, on the basis of this rationale I would expect an impression formation 
task consisting of 20 inconsistent behaviours to provide the motivation 
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necessary to activate the attribution process. Moreover, these processing 
conditions should provide attributionally complex persons with enough 
motivation to engage their complex attributional schemata, and 
consequently organise and reconcile conflicting incoming information 
more effectively. This advanced processing should lead to better recall at a 
later date. 
In this study, subjects were supplied with a list of 20 conflicting behaviours, 
either as an impression formation task or under memory instruction 
conditions. Because the memory instructions involve learning individual 
behaviours, there should be little activation of the attribution process and 
hence no need to engage causal schemata. Thus, in the condition where 
subjects were instructed to memorise the behaviours, I expected no 
difference in recall of items between attributionally complex and simple 
persons. This latter hypothesis is critical because any differences between 
complex and simple subjects in the impression conditions could then be 
simply explained by the hypothesis that complex subjects have better 
memory for person information per. se. than simple subjects. 
Based on the rationale that in-depth processing of contradictory behaviours 
in an impression formation task would trigger attributional analysis of 
information in an attempt to resolve the inconsistencies, I derived several 
predictions. First, I hypothesised that under instructions to either form an 
impression of a target person, or form an impression and justify a 
subsequent written personality account, attributionally complex people 
would recall more behaviourial sentences than attributionally simple 
people. However, under instructions to memorise the behaviourial 




This study was designed to explore the effect of individual differences in 
attributional complexity on subjects1 ability to form an impression of a 
target person described by 20 conflicting behaviourial predicates. Further, 
this research tested a depth of processing model which proposes that deeper, 
more elaborate, psychological processing improves memory. 
The major hypotheses of this study were as follows: 
a) Subjects instructed to form an impression of a target person described by a 
series of behaviours would be able to recall more of those items than 
subjects who wei;e instructed to remember as many of the items as possible. 
b) Attributionally complex and attributionally simple people would not 
differ in the number of behaviours recalled, under instructions to simply 
memorise the behaviourial sentences. 
c) Subjects instructed to form an impression and write a description of the 
target person, and subsequently discuss and justify their account would 
recall more items compared to subjects either instructed to form an 
impression, or simply remember as many of the behaviours as possible. 
d) Under instructions to either form an impression of the target person or 
form an impression, and justify and discuss a subsequent written 
personality account, attributionally complex people would recall more 





Subjects designated as either attributionally complex or attributionally 
simple were exposed to a sequence of 20 behaviourial descriptions under 
instructions to either: (a) memorise as many of the behaviours as they 
could; (b) form an impression of a person described by these various actions, 
or (c) form an impression, and subsequently write a personality description 
of the person and justify it with another subject. 
Following a 5 minute distraction task, two dependent measures were 
administered. Subjects in all three conditions were asked to recall as many 
of the behaviours as they could. Second, subjects in the impression 
formation and impression formation/justification conditions were 
instructed to write a personality description of the target person. 
This experiment was therefore a 2 (attributionally complex x simple) X 3 
(memory x impression formation x impression formation/justification) 
design. Both independent variables were between-group factors. 
Subjects 
The Attributional Complexity Scale (Appendix A) was administered to 388 
female2 students at the University of Canterbury. Attributional complexity 
scores were derived (possible range from -84 to 84) and subjects who scored 
2 Several researchers have found that women generally perform better on the Attributional 
Complexity Scale than men (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1986). This leads to problems in setting cut 
off scores for men and women. Hence, balancing the cell sizes for the simple and complex 
groups is also confounded. To avoid these problems the sample was confined to women only. 
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in the upper and lower quartiles of the scale were designated as 
attributionally complex and simple respectively. The final sample consisted 
of 51 attributionally complex and 51 attributionally simple subjects. Mean 
scores for the attributionally simple and complex subjects are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 
Mean Attributional Complexity Scores for Attributionally Simple and 
Complex Subjects in the Memory, Impression Formation and Impression 
Formation/Justification Processing Conditions. 
Attributional Complexity 
Processing Condition Simple Complex 
Memory 2.6 (8.3) 57.7 (10.1) 
Impression 1.8 (12.3) 57.6 (7.2) 
Impression/Justification 2.9 (10.2) 57.2 (11.3) 
Note. The SD's for each cell are shown in brackets. 
Development of Stimulus Materials 
A set of 20 behaviourial descriptions characteristic of the stimulus person 
was constructed from 10 pairs of incongruent traits. These items were 
adapted from pairs of inharmonious dispositions developed by Asch and 
Zukier (1984) and Rosenberg and Sedlak (1972). A pilot study was conducted 
to develop a list of behaviours that were individually prototypical of the 
selected traits. Various combinations of the behaviours were presented to 78 
students from three second year General Psychology classes with 
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instructions to write down the trait that best described each behaviour. The 
responses were analysed and then edited to yield a single behaviourial 
description for each of the 20 traits. These behaviours were chosen so as to 
be moderately inconsistent with one another rather than homogeneous. 
The full list of behaviours can be found in Appendix B. The sentences were 
randomly ordered and the same list of behaviours was used for each 
experimental condition. 
Procedure 
Subjects were run in small groups ranging in size from 2 to 8, with each 
session randomly assigned to orie experimental condition. Subjects were 
told the experiment was concerned with person perception processes and 
would involve viewing a series of slides and answering several questions 
about them. The instructions were adapted from those used by Hamilton, 
Katz and Leirer (1980a). 
The impression formation instructions: 
This experiment is concerned with the way we form an impression of a person on 
the basis of his or her actions. To do this, we have selected information about a 
person who is unfamiliar to you. In a few moments you will be shown a series of 
slides, each slide containing a single description of this person's behaviour. 
Please read these sentences carefully, studying each one until the next appears on 
the screen. Do not be concerned with memorisation - there. are far too many 
individual items to remember. Try instead to form an overall impression of what 
the person who performed these various actions is like. At the end of the session 
we will ask you a series of questions concerning the impression that you have 
formed of the person described in these sentences. 
The impression formation/justification instructions: 
This experiment is concerned with the way we form an impression of a person on 
the basis of his or her actions. To do this, we have selected information about a 
person who is unfamiliar to you. In a few moments you will be shown a series of 
slides, each slide containing a single description of this person's behaviour. 
Please read these sentences carefully, studying each one until the next appears on 
the screen. Do not be concerned with memorisation - there are far too many 
individual items to remember. Try instead to form an overall impression of 
what the person who performed these various actions is like. At the end of the 
session you will write a personality description, giving an account of the 
impression that you have formed of the person described in these sentences. 
Following this, you will get together with another member of the group to 
discuss and justify your personality description and impression. 
The instructions for people in the memory condition read as follows: 
This experiment is concerned with the way in which we memorise verbal 
descriptions of action. In a few moments you will be shown a series of slides, each 
slide containing a description of a different person's behaviour. Please read these 
sentences carefully, studying each one until the next slide appears on the screen. 
Try to remember the exact wording of each single description as accurately as you 
can. At the end of the session, we will ask you a series of questions pertaining to 
the information contained in these sentences. 
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Each slide was shown for a period of 10 seconds, controlled automatically by 
an electrical timer. The order in which the 20 slides was presented was 
randomly decided and was the same for all subjects. 
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After the slides had been presented, each subject was seated at a table and 
given a sheet of paper. A five minute distraction task was carried out to 
reduce short term memory for the behaviours. They were told to write 
down the names of as many New Zealand city and town names as they 
could think of. 
The dependent measures were administered at the conclusion of the 5 
minute distraction task. Following completion of the dependent measures, 
subjects were fully debriefed as to the nature and purpose of the study. 
Dependent Measures 
Free Recall of Behaviours 
Immediately following the distraction task, all subjects were given a sheet of 
paper headed up with the following instructions: 
We would like you to recall and write down as many behaviours you read about as 
you can. Try to remember them in as close to the exact wording as possible. 
However, if you cannot remember the exact wording but can remember the idea, 
write that down as well. 
Four minutes was permitted for subjects to write down as many behaviours 
as they could recall. This time period was sufficient for all subjects. 
The free recall protocols were scored on the basis of "gist." That is, responses 
were scored as correct if they conveyed the basic idea of the behaviourial 
item, even if the wording was different. However, responses that simply 
characterised the behaviour of the person in abstract terms (for example, "he 
did something rude," or "he was friendly") were not counted. The author 
scored each recall protocol, blind to the condition or complexity level of the 
subject. To check the reliability of the coding, a second coder coded 50% of 
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the protocols selected randomly from each condition. An agreement rate of 
96% was reached. 
Written Personality Description 
Subjects in the impression formation and impression 
formation/justification conditions were instructed to write a personality 
description based on their impression of the stimulus person. Although no 
time limit was placed on this activity, most subjects had completed the task 
within five minutes. 
The complexity level of the personality descriptions were assessed using two 
criteria adapted from scale developed by Fletcher, Grigg and Bull (1988): (a) 
the number of personality dispositions listed, and (b) the number· of causal 
connections mentioned. The first measure, concerning the number of 
personality dispositions, referred to internal stable traits, beliefs, and 
abilities. Stimulus behaviours repeated from the free recall task were not 
included. As for the free recall protocols, the author coded each description, 
blind to the condition or complexity level of the subject. The second rater 
again coded 50% of the protocols selected randomly from each condition. 
An agreement rate of 86% was achieved. 
The second measure of complexity was assessed by scoring the number of 
causal connections mentioned in the personality descriptions. The presence 
of each of the following linkages was counted as a causal connection: (a) 
explaining a behaviour by relating it to an internal disposition (for example, 
he demanded service first in the queue because he was selfish); (b) relating a 
disposition to a past causal factor (for example, he visited his sick aunty 
because he had a nurturant upbringing); (c) explaining how one disposition 
is causally linked to another (for example, he was often rude to achieve his 
selfish aims). The author coded all the personality descriptions for causal 
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connections blind to the participants' complexity level or experimental 
condition. After a short training period, the second rater coded 50% of the 
protocols. The inter-rater reliability achieved was 85%. 
The mean number of causal connections produced was 3.0 (SD= 2.8) and the 
mean number of dispositions was 7.4 (SD = 3.1). As the two measures of 
complexity were significantly positively correlated (r = .27, p < .05), an 
overall complexity score was derived. This was achieved by standardising 




The findings of this study will be presented in three main sections. First, the 
results from the free recall task will be reported. Second, the personality 
description complexity scores for subjects in the impression formation and 
impression formation/justification conditions will be analysed. Finally, the 
hypothesis that complexity of causal processing mediates the link between 
attributional complexity and memory for the behaviours will be 
investigated. 
Free Recall of Behaviours 
The first analysis examined the behaviour-recall performance of subjects. A 
2 (attributionally complex vs. simple) X 3 (memory vs. impression 
formation vs. impression formation/justification) analysis of variance was 
conducted on participants' recall score. Cell means from this analysis are 
shown in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 1. 
This analysis yielded a significant main effect for processing condition, 
F(2,96) = 39.7, p < .0001. As predicted, subjects recalled most behaviours 
when they were instructed to write a personality description (M = 11.8) or 
form an impression (M = 10.9) of the target person and fewer behaviours 
when they had been told to remember as many of the behaviours as possible 
(M = 7.1). These results replicate the common findings in this area of 
research. 
Overall, there was also a main effect for attributional complexity, F(l,96) = 
9.6, p < .005. Across all three processing conditions, attributionally complex 
subjects recalled more behaviours (M = 10.6) than attributionally simple 
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people (M = 9.2). This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. However, the 
interaction between processing set and attributional complexity was not 
significant, F(2,96) = 1.0, n.s. 
Table 3 
Mean Number of Behaviours Recalled by Attributionally Simple and 
Complex Subjects in the Memory, Impression Formation and Impression 
Formation/I ustification Processing Conditions. 
Attributional Complexity 
Processing Condition Simple Complex 
Memory 6.8 (1.8) 7.3 (2.9) 
n's 18 18 
Impression 9.9 (2.8) 11.8 (1.6) 
n's 18 18 
Impression/Justification 10.9 (2.6) 12.8 (1.8) 
n's 15 15 
Note. The SD's for each cell are shown in brackets. 
Planned Comparisons 
A series of planned comparisons was calculated across the three processing 
conditions and the two attributional complexity levels. 
First, it was hypothesised that subjects in the impression formation and 
impression formation/justification conditions would recall more 
behaviourial items than would persons in the memory condition. These 
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predictions were strongly supported, t (71) = 48.1, p < .001; t (65) = 24.92, p < 
.001). However, the prediction that impression formation/justification 
condition subjects would recall significantly more behaviours than those 
only instructed to form an impression was only weakly supported, t (65) = 
2.90, p < .10. 
It was also hypothesised that attributionally complex subjects would recall 
significantly more behaviours than attributionally simple persons in both 
the impression formation and impression formation/justification 
processing conditions. However, in the memory condition, it was predicted 
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Figure 1. Recall Scores for Attributionally Complex and Simple Subjects in 
the Three Processing Conditions. 
These predictions were confirmed using planned comparisons. Complex 
people recalled significantly more behaviours than simple subjects, both 
under instructions to form an impression of the target person, t (35) = 5.67, 
p < .025, and under impression formation/justification instructions, t (29) = 
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5.25, p < .025. However, in the memory condition, attributionally simple 
and complex subjects recalled very similar numbers of behaviours, t < 1. 
Table 4 
Mean Causal Complexity Scores of Personality Descriptions as a Function of 

















Note. Higher causal complexity scores represent more complex personality descriptions. The 
SD's for each cell are shown in brackets. One case was not included because of missing 
data. 
Personality Description Complexity Scores 
A 2 (Attributionally complex vs. simple) X 2 (impression formation vs. 
impression formation/justification) analysis of variance was carried out on 
the personality description complexity scores. Cell means from this analysis 
are shown in Table 4. 
The main effect for attributional complexity was close to achieving 
significance, F(l,61) = 2.9, p < .09. Although not significant, as predicted, 
attributionally complex subjects (M = 0.32) wrote more complex personality 
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descriptions than attributionally simple people (M = -0.36). No other main 
effects or interactions were significant.3 
The Mediating Effect of Causal Processing on Free Recall Scores 
Why did attributionally complex subjects recall significantly more 
behaviours on the free recall task than simple persons in the two 
impression formation conditions? One possibility is that the complexity of 
causal processing while encoding the behaviours mediated the link between 
attributional complexity and performance on the free recall task. This 
possibility was tested using a mediational model. 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986) the following conditions must apply 
for a variable to function as a mediator (see Figure 2): (a). variations in levels 
of the independent variable significantly account for variations in the 
hypothesised mediator (Path a); (b) variations in the mediator significantly 
account for variations in the dependent variable (path b), and (c) when paths 
a and b are controlled, a previously significant relation between the 
independent and dependent variables is no longer significant. The strongest 
incidence of mediation occurs when Path c drops to zero. However, because 
social phenomena have multiple causes it may be more realistic to identify 
mediators that significantly decrease Path c rather than expecting a reduction 
to zero. 
3 Analyses were also carried out on the two measures of causal complexity independently, for 
both (a) the number of personality dispositions listed, and (b) the number of causal 












Figure 2: Hypothesised Mediational Model for Impression Formation and 
Impression Formation/Justification Processing Conditions. 
Source: Baron and Kenny (1986, p.1176). 
Three regression equations were calculated to test the linkages of the 
hypothesised mediational model in both the impression formation and 
impression formation/justification conditions. First, the hypothesised 
mediator (measured by the causal complexity of the personality 
descriptions) was regressed on the independent variable (attributional 
complexity) (path a). Second, the dependent variable (recall score) was 
regressed on the independent variable (attributional complexity), and third, 
the dependent variable (recall score) was regressed on both the independent 
variable (attributional complexity) and the mediator variable (causal 
processing) to obtain paths b and c. 
The mediation hypothesis for the impression formation condition was not 
supported. None of the regression coefficients for paths a and b were 
significant. Moreover, the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable was not significantly less when the mediating variable 
was controlled for (fl = 0.36) than when it was not controlled for (j3 = 0.38). 
This pattern of results was similar for the impression 
formation/justification condition. The independent variable (attributional 
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complexity) did affect the dependent variable (recall score) in the second 
equation, /3= 0.41, p < .025, and the mediator (causal processing) weakly 
affected the dependent variable (recall score) in the third equation (/3= 0.32, p 
< .10). However, the effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable was not significantly less when the mediating variable was 
controlled for (f3 = 0.34) than when it was not controlled for (f3 = 0.41). 
In summary, the regression analysis offered little support for the 
hypothesised mediational model4 (Figure 2). Specifically, there was no 
evidence that the complexity of causal processing (at least as measured in 
the personality description) was mediating the link between attributional 
complexity and performance on the free recall task. 
4 Regression equations were also calculated on the two measures of causal complexity 
independently, for both (a) the number of personality dispositions listed, and (b) the number 




The major aim of this study was to investigate the effects of individual 
differences in schemata complexity in the ability to store and recall 
personality impressions. The study also examined three levels of a model 
which predicted that more in-depth processing instructions would enhance 
retrieval of information from person memory. 
The results demonstrated that memory for person impressions is the 
product of an interacting and complex set of processes. The following 
discussion will be presented in four main sections. First, I will review the 
results of the study with respect to the hypotheses derived from the Depth of 
Processing model. Second, I will propose that these findings can be also 
explained according to the role of the causal attribution process in 
impression formation. In the ·third section I will review the results 
regarding individual differences in subjects' recall of stimulus items, the 
complexity of their personality descriptions, and the mediating effect of 
causal processing on behaviourial recall. Finally, I will draw some 
conclusions and implications from these results for the challenging study of 
impression formation. 
Depth of Processing Model: Recall of Behaviours 
It was hypothesised that memory for person information would 
significantly improve across the three processing tasks. The main effect for 
this processing set manipulation was significant and supported the 
hypotheses. As expected, subjects provided with instructions to either: (a) 
form an impression, or (b) form an impression and write a personality 
account of the target person recalled significantly more behaviour 
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descriptions than subjects given the memory instructions. This finding of 
superior recall of impression formation conditions over memory 
instructions replicates results reported by other investigators (e.g., Hamilton, 
Katz & Leirer, 1980a, 1980b; Srull, 1981, 1983; Srull, Lichtenstein & Rothbart, 
1985; Wyer & Gordon, 1982). 
This finding has traditionally been accounted for by the high degree of 
information organisation inherent in the impression formation process, 
compared to the memory condition (Hamilton, 1981). This organisation, in 
the form of a network of inter-item associations is then assumed to enhance 
recall of the information at a later time. Memory condition subjects, on the 
other hand, were presumably restricted to less advanced organisational 
strategies for representing the information in memory, and hence, recalled 
fewer behaviours. 
A further explanation of these findings stems from work (Gordon, 1982; 
Hamilton, Leirer & Katz, 1979; Hoffman, Mischel & Mazze, 1981; Jeffrey & 
Mischel, 1979) which has found that impression and memory subjects 
engage in qualitatively different organisational strategies when encoding the 
stimulus information. Specifically, impression formation subjects organise 
the behaviours in terms of relevant personality schemata (or traits) to a 
greater extent than memory instruction subjects. This implies in the 
present study, for example; that perceivers would have been likely to store 
the behaviour 11He greeted everyone with a smile," under the trait 
11friendly11 and this organisational strategy would have enhanced later 
retrieval of this information. 
The second hypothesis that subjects instructed to form an impression, write 
a description, and subsequently discuss and justify their account would 
recall more items than subjects instructed solely to form an impression was 
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not supported. However, the results (p < .10) were consistent with the 
hypothesised pattern. 
Overall, the results from the first two hypotheses provide strong support for 
the interpretation that impression formation instructions trigger the 
activation of relevant personality schemas for storing and organising person 
information in memory. The cognitive representation of this information 
then serves as an effective strategy for retrieving these behaviours when 
required. 
Furthermore, these results are consistent with Fiske and Taylor's (1984) 
depth of processing account of person memory which proposes that deeper, 
more elaborate processing of stimulus information enhances one's memory 
for that material. These findings clearly demonstrate therefore, the 
important link between the experimenter's instructions and subjects 
hypothesised cognitive processes5 as well as highlighting that schematic 
organisation is a crucial part of the impression formation process. 
The Role of Causal Attributions in the Impression Formation Process 
The results also support Hamilton's (1988) contention that attributional 
analysis plays an important role in person information processing systems. 
As previously argued, the attribution process is an inferential activity in 
which the perceiver goes beyond the available information to develop the 
cognitive representation of the stimulus person. This development 
involves processing the behaviours in terms of the existing information 
and/ or pre-existing schematic structures to provide a causal explanation of 
the stimulus material. To the extent that this inferential activity occurs, the 
5 See Hastie, Park and Weber (1984) for an excellent discussion of the influence of various 
encoding tasks on the way in which information is encoded, organised and retrieved from 
person memory. 
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more effectively this information should be represented in memory, and 
hence more easily retrieved at a later time (Hamilton et al., 1990). 
Several features in the design of this study may have particularly 
encouraged attributional processing, including unexpected person 
information (Clary & Tesser, 1983), pairs of contradictory behaviours (Asch 
& Zukier, 1984), and the presence of questions inquiring about the causes of 
behaviour (Bassili & Smith, 1986). In this study, these enabling conditions 
were present in (a) the construction of the stimulus behaviours, and (b) the 
structure of the impression formation instructions. 
Thus, I believe that the target person described by the set of stimulus items 
encouraged perceivers to indulge in attributional processing, but only in the 
two impression formation task instruction sets. These conditions required 
perceivers to engage in in-depth and conscious dispositional processing of 
the stimulus material, whereas the memory instructions were presumably 
invoking strategies that were less likely to explore the causal implications of 
interrelating the items. 
Consequently, the behaviours processed by subjects in the two impression 
formation conditions received extended causal processing and were 
represented in and retrieved from memory more efficiently than subjects in 
the memory instruction condition (Hamilton et al., 1990). How then did 
individual differences in subjects' pre-existing schema structures effect 
attributional processing during the impression formation process? 
Individual Differences in Impression Formation 
Free Recall of Behaviours 
The central question I wanted to explore in this study concerned whether 
differences in schema complexity influenced the encoding and 
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representation of person information in memory. As predicted, subjects 
with more complex attributional schemata recalled more behaviours in the 
two impression formation tasks than the attributionally simple subjects. 
Crucially, however, the difference in behaviour recall between 
attributionally complex and simple people was not significant under 
instructions to simply memorise the person information. This finding 
therefore, precludes the most obvious explanation for differences between 
attributionally complex and simple folk in the two impression conditions; 
namely that complex subjects have better memory for person information 
per. se. 
These results support Fletcher et al's (1988) contention that persons with 
more complex attributional schemata are capable of representing and 
recalling person information from memory more efficiently than those 
with simple attributional schemata, but only under conditions that 
encourage in-depth processing of the stimulus information. Under 
instructions to simply memorise the behaviours, there was presumably 
minimal motivation or opportunity to engage attributional schemata; thus 
both attributionally complex and simple subjects most likely utilised 
relatively unsophisticated memory strategies to represent the information 
in memory. 
A further explanation of these results was outlined by Fletcher, Grigg and 
Bull (1988). They interpreted the superior performance of attributionally 
complex subjects to be due to their ability to integrate a variety of trait 
related person information, providing that the material was processed in an 
in-depth manner. However, identical in-depth processing conditions 
produced a drop off in the ability of simple subjects to engage in trait 
attributions. These and other results by Fletcher and his colleagues 
(Fletcher, Reeder & Bull, 1990) support the contention that it is when the 
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processing conditions encourage conscious, in-depth, attributional analysis 
that individuals' personality schemata have their strongest impact. 
These results also contribute to the paucity of research investigating 
individual differences in person memory processes. Specifically, they are 
consistent with an individual differences study by Srull, Lichtenstein and 
Rothbart (1985) which found that high need for cognition subjects recalled 
more behaviours in an impression formation task than low need for 
cognition subjects. Consistent with the attributional complexity findings 
found here, higher recall by the high need for cognition subjects was 
attributed by Srull et al. to their greater motivation to think about the 
behaviours in relation to one another, which developed more associative 
links between the items, and hence facilitated recall of the behaviours 
compared to low need for cognition subjects. 
Both studies demonstrate that stable individual differences can be important 
moderators of person memory. Indeed, future research could look toward 
investigating other relevant individual difference variables. Two 
possibilities include individual differences in locus of control (Rotter, 1966), 
and in the intolerance of ambiguity (MacDonald, 1970). For example, Ellis 
and Franklin (1983) discovered that individual differences in locus of 
control were related to significant individual differences in how 
information was recalled from person memory. 
Personality Description Complexity Scores 
It was predicted that attributionally complex subjects would write more 
complex personality descriptions than attributionally simple subjects in the 
two impression formation conditions. This hypothesis was only weakly 
upheld. This finding provides some support for a similar study by Fletcher, 
Grigg and Bull (1988), who found that following a brief 15 minute 
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conversation, attributionally complex subjects produced more complex and 
accurate personality impressions than simple folk when conscious 
dispositional and in-depth attributional processing was encouraged. 
Interestingly however, this difference between the two groups was not 
evident when the conversation task was more casual and not aimed at 
personality appraisal. 
One explanation for the null finding in this research may lie in the nature 
of this study's processing task compared to that of Fletcher et al's (1988). It is 
clear from this earlier research, that the 15 minute conversation provided 
considerably more material and time to base a written personality account 
on, as compared to the processing task in the current study. It is possible 
that 20 behaviourial descriptions of a target person may not have provided 
enough person material for the attributionally complex subjects to fully 
exert their higher order cognitive schemata. Another possibility is that the 
10 seconds to process each behaviour may also have provided little time for 
extensive higher order processing. 
The Mediating Effect of Causal Processing on Free Recall 
The prediction that the complexity of causal processing while encoding the 
stimulus items mediated the link between attributional complexity and 
subsequent behaviourial recall was not supported by the mediational 
analysis. One possible explanation for this null result may have been that 
the processing measure was not a true gauge of causal complexity because it 
was administered after the free recall task. Second, the processing measure 
may have been an insensitive measure of spontaneous causal attributions, 
as subjects were asked for a personality description and not causal 
explanations per. se. Thus, future research could develop a more sensitive 
measure to more accurately assess the mediating role of causal processing in 
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the relationship between attributional complexity and how impressions are 
represented and retrieved from person memory. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Taken together, the free recall and personality account results support the 
three aims of this research: (a) that deeper, more psychologically task 
instructions improve memory for social information; (b) that causal 
attribution processes play an important role in how personality impressions 
are organised and retrieved from memory, and (c) that there are differences 
in ability to engage in this attributional analysis that effect the nature of the 
person impressions. However, these differences in ability are only exhibited 
under conditions that encourage in-depth processing of social information. 
Attribution is one process, in which the perceiver goes beyond the 
behaviourial information to draw inferences about the person's underlying 
personality characteristics. There are of course many other elements to 
forming an impression, including, for example, the evaluative reactions, 
observers opinions, or indeed the person's physical appearance. However, 
the integration of attributional research and theory with the study of person 
memory processes within an information processing paradigm, should be 
fruitful in expanding our knowledge of social cognition. 
The results from this study also have implications for other important areas 
within attribution theory and social cognition. I shall briefly mention two: 
(a) the relationship between attributional complexity and social intelligence, 
and (b) the implications for a re-worked naive scientist model of social 
psychology. 
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Attributional Complexity and Social Intelligence 
One important issue relevant to these results is the relationship between 
intelligence and attributional complexity. An alternative explanation of the 
superior recall of the attributionally complex subjects in the two impression 
formation conditions might be that attributional complexity is merely a re-
packaged intelligence test. However, two separate sets of evidence dismiss 
such a claim. 
First, the results demonstrated that attributionally complex subjects recalled 
more stimulus items than attributionally simple subjects only in the two in-
depth processing conditions and not in the memory condition. 
Second, Fletcher and his colleagues (Fletcher, et al., 1986; Fletcher, et al., 
1988) found that attributional complexity was not correlated with standard 
IQ tests, or with general academic ability. However, the present results and 
those of other researchers (Fletcher et al., 1990; Funder & Harris, 1986; 
Sternberg and Smith, 1985) suggest that attributional complexity can best be 
understood as a form of social intelligence. 
Implications for a Re-worked Naive Scientist Model of Social Psychology 
On a more conceptual level, individual differences in perceivers ability to 
represent and recall person information from memory has implications for 
contemporary social psychological theory. Traditionally, there has been two 
competing theoretical paradigms in social cognition: (a) The naive scientist 
model, and (b) The cognitive miser model. 
The central premise of the naive scientist model is that human cognition is 
rational and scientific. It assumes that the layperson's causal explanations 
for human behaviour are similar to that of a scientist: explanation, 
45 
prediction, and control (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965). This approach 
views the causal attribution process as rational and that the layperson does a 
fairly good job of extracting useful stable impressions from their analyses of 
people. 
In contrast, the cognitive miser model which claims that the layperson's 
cognitive processes are severely hampered by inferential biases has been the 
dominant theoretical focus of the 1980s. This more disparaging view of the 
naive perceiver proposes that cognitive processes are governed by simple 
rules or heuristics that often lead to error. (Hamilton & Rose, 1980). 
According to this approach, laypeople are lazy thinkers, looking to navigate 
the social world with a minimum of effort. 
However, the 1990s is signalling a reaction against the cognitive miser 
model. Specifically, a reworking of the naive scientist model (Fletcher, in 
press) suggests a compromise between the two views. Fletcher argues that 
under favourable processing conditions, laypeople will be quite accurate in 
their personality inferences, but that under unfavourable processing 
conditions they will fall back on heuristics or rules of thumb consistent with 
the cognitive miser model. 
Results from the current study add further support to one class of conditions 
that appear to influence social inference biases: individual differences. 
Specifically, these results lend weight to the claim that some people are 
indeed more proficient naive (social) scientists than others, under 
favourable information processing conditions. 
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Appendixl 
University of Canterbury, Department of Psychology 
Cognitive Processing Scale 
Please indicate your name, age and sex below: 
Name: ................................... . Sex: male/ female 
Instructions 
This questionnaire has been designed to investigate the different ways that 
people think about themselves: The questionnaire will be kept completely 
confidential. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your 
own perceptions .. 
Please answer each question as honestly and accurately as you can, but don't 
spend too much time thinking about each answer. 
Scoring Procedure 
The numbers on each scale represent the following degrees of agreement. 
-3 = very untrue/inaccurate 
-2 = moderately untrue/inaccurate 
-1 = slightly untrue/inaccurate 
0 = neither true nor untrue, accurate or inaccurate 
1 = slightly true/accurate 
2 = moderately true/ accurate 
3 = very true/accurate 
Read each statement carefully and show your agreement or disagreement by 
circling one number on each scale. If what you believe or think about 
yourself is in agreement with the statement, circle one of the numbers from 
1 to 3. If what you believe or think about yourself conflicts with the 
statement, circle one of the negative numbers. If you neither agree nor 
disagree circle the zero. 
Example 1): If the statement said "I am very tall" you would circle the 2 if you were 
moderately tall, the zero if you were average height, and the -3 if you were very 
short. 
Example 2): If the statement said "I believe in the death penalty for murder", you 
would circle the 3 if you very strongly believed that, the 1 if you slightly 
believed it, and the -3 if you strongly believed the opposite, that is, murder 
should not carry the death penalty. 
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1) I have thought a lot about the family background and personal history 
of people who are close to me, in order to understand why they are the 
sort of people they are. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
2) I believe it is important to analyse and understand our own thinking 
processes. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
3) I think a lot about the influence that I have on other people's 
behaviour. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
4) I have found that relationships between a person's attitudes, beliefs, 
habits and character traits are usually simple and straight-forward. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
5) If I see people behaving in a really strange or peculiar manner I usually 
put it down to the fact that they are strange people and don't bother to 
explain it any further. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
6) Once I have figured out a single cause for a person's behaviour I don't 
usually go any further. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
7) I don't usually bother trying to analyse and explain people's behaviour. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
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8) I have often found that the basic cause for a person's behaviour is 
located far back in time. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
9) I am very interested in understanding how my own thinking works 
when I make judgements about people or attach causes to their 
behaviour. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
10) I think very little about the different ways that people influence each 
other. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
11) To understand a person's personality /behaviour I have found that it is 
important to know how that person's attitudes, beliefs, and character 
traits fit together. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
12) When I try to explain other people's behaviour I concentrate on the 
person and don't worry too much about all the existing external factors 
that might be affecting then:i. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
13) I have found that the causes for people's behaviour are usually 
complex rather than simple. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
14) I don't enjoy getting into discussions where the causes for people's 
behaviour are being talked over. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
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15) When I analyse a person's behaviour I often find that the causes form a 
chain that go back in time, sometimes for years. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
16) I give little thought to how my own thinking works in the process of 
understanding or explaining people's behaviour. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
17) I think very little about the influence that other people have on my 
behaviour. 
very untrue -3 -2 -1 0 
or inaccurate 
1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
18) I have thought a lot about the way that different parts of my personality 
influence other parts, e.g., beliefs affecting attitudes or attitudes 
affecting character traits. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
19) I think a lot about the influence that society has on other people. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
20) I usually find that complicated explanations for people's behaviour are 
confusing rather than helpful. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
21) I really enjoy analysing the reasons or causes for people's behaviour. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
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22) I have thought very little about my own family background and 
personal history in order to understand why I am the sort of person I 
am. 
very µntrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
23) When the reasons I give for my own behaviour are different from 
someone else's, this often makes me think about the thinking 
processes that lead to my explanations. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
24) I believe that to understand a person you need to know and 
understand the people who that person has close contact with. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
25) I tend to take people's behaviour at face value and not worry about the 
inner causes for their behaviour, e.g., attitudes, beliefs, etc. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
26) I think a lot about the influence that society has on my behaviour and 
personality. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 very true 
or accurate 
27) I prefer simple rather than complex explanations for people's 
behaviour. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 
-2 -1 0 1 
28) I am not really curious about human behaviour. 
very untrue -3 
or inaccurate 








List of Stimulus Behaviours 
He moped around home all day 
He risked his life to save the drowning man 
He went to the movies alone on Saturday night 
He never did his rostered duties in the flat 
He conversed freely with many people at the party 
He demanded service first in the busy queue 
He pledged $100 to charity 
He provoked a fist fight. 
He greeted everyone with a smile 
He cancelled his annual holiday to attend a work seminar 
He consistently found fault with those around him 
He invited friends to a potluck dinner at his house 
He felt awkward when meeting new people 
He visited his sick Aunty every weekend 
He told a lot of funny stories at the party 
He failed his driving license three times 
He returned a wallet containing money to the police 
He loudly made a comment about the woman's shoes 
He scored highly in all his exams 




Pilot Study to Develop Stimulus Behaviours 
Consider the following behaviours and write down the trait that you think 
best describes each one. 
Example 1: He was dux of the school 
Example 2: He always told the truth 
Trait: Intelligent 
Trait: Honest 
Note: If more than one trait comes to mind, please write it down as well. 
BEHAVIOURS 
1. He felt low and moped around home 
Trait: 
2. He risked his life to save the drowning man 
Trait: 
3. He had no-one to go with, so he went to the movies alone 
Trait: 
4. He never did his rostered duties in the flat 
Trait: 
5. He mixed freely with many people at the party 
Trait: 
6. He demanded service first in the busy queue 
Trait: 
7. He pledged $100 to charity 
Trait: 
8. He provoked a fist fight 
Trait: 
9. He felt awkward when meeting new people 
Trait: 
10. He cancelled his annual holiday to attend a work seminar 
Trait: 
11. He consistently found fault with those around him 
Trait: 
12. He invited his new neighbours to dinner 
Trait: 
13. He greeted everyone with a smile 
Trait: 
14. He visited his sick Aunty every weekend 
Trait: 
15. He told a lot of funny stories at the party 
Trait: 
16. He failed his driving license three times 
Trait: 
17. He was in good spirits 
Trait: 
18. He was easily upset by others' comments about him 
Trait: 
19. His goal was to become head of the corporation 
Trait: 
20. He sold a scratched album to a record dealer after telling him it was 
new Trait: 
63 
21. He mixed well with various social groups 
Trait: 
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Please generate three-to-ten word behaviour descriptions for each 
of the following traits 
Example: 
Consider a person who is very intelligent ; you would expect to see her 
(him) ............. win the chess tournament 
1. Consider a person who is very cheerful ; you would expect to see her 
(him) 
2. Consider a person who is very gloomy ; you would expect to see her 
(him) 
3. Consider a person who is very ambitious ; you would expect to see her 
(him) 
.............................................................................................................................................. 
4. Consider a person who is very critical ; you would expect to see her (him) 
5. Consider a person who is very sensitive ; you would expect to see her 
(him) 
............................................................................................................................................... 
6. Consider a person who is very un-intelligent ; you would expect to see 
her 
(him) ................................................................................................................................. . 
Thanks 
